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Federalism and Supreme Court Review: Is
Article V an Exception to the
Independent and Adequate State
Grounds Doctrine?
Introduction
A basic tenet of federalism is the recognition that the power to gov-
em lies in more than one central governmental unit.1 This balancing of
power has produced many theories on the proper relative authority and
independence of each governmental unit.2 Although various theories
may give greater or lesser guidance in resolving federal/state conflicts,
none will extinguish the underlying tension inherent in any system that
recognizes sovereign authority in more than one central governmental
unit.3
It is a long established rule that the United States Supreme Court
may review state court rulings on federal law.4 However, nowhere is the
tension of federalism more apparent than in questions of Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments when those judgments
involve both state and federal grounds.' In these cases, the Supreme
Court has long tried to harmonize state autonomy and federal judicial
review through the jurisdictional doctrine of "independent and adequate
state grounds." 6 However, litigation involving Article V, the amendment
1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison).
2. See generally Skover, "Phoenix Rising" and Federalism Analysis, 13 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 271 (1986); Wisdom, Forword: The Ever-Whirling Wheels of American Federalism, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1063 (1984).
3. See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
CIAL POWER 205-31 (1980).
4. Hunter v. Martin's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816) (discussed infra notes 34-38
and accompanying text).
5. See M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 6.
6. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207,
210 (1935). Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), is generally regarded
as the first enunciation of the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine, see P. HAY &
R. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL SYSTEM: LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 212 (1982); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 119-20
(1978), although controversy has arisen over its more recent applications. See Welsh, Whose
Federalism?-The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HASTINGS
CONT. L.Q. 819, 819-20 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court now reverses state court
judgments that afford "too much protection" of individual rights).
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provision of the United States Constitution, raises some unanticipated
problems for the independent state grounds solution.
This Comment will examine the problem of Supreme Court review
of cases involving Article V when the state court decision rests on in-
dependent and adequate state grounds. Part I places this problem in its
current context by reviewing Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Uhler v.
AFL-CIO7 and Montanans for a Balanced Federal Budget Committee v.
Harper. I Part II discusses the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state
court decisions and the doctrine of independent and adequate state
grounds, focusing particularly on the criteria by which the Court deter-
mines whether a state ground is inadequate to support a judgment. Part
III examines two difficulties in analyzing Article V litigation under tradi-
tional independent state grounds theory: defining the right guaranteed
by Article V, and identifying the nature of the states' power under Arti-
cle V. The Comment concludes that Article V issues can never be sub-
ject to the independent state ground limitation on Supreme Court review
because state court decisions involving Article V can never rest on state
grounds.
I. The "Independent State Grounds" of Uhler v. AFL-CIO and
Montanans For a Balanced Federal Budget
Committee v. Harper
In AFL-CIO v. Eu,9 the California Supreme Court prohibited the
placement of a proposed "Balanced Federal Budget Statutory Initiative"
on California's November 1984 ballot. The initiative would have re-
quired the California legislature to apply to Congress under Article V of
the federal Constitution to convene a constitutional convention for con-
sideration of a balanced federal budget amendment."0 Despite the fact
that the initiative had satisfied every procedural requirement," the court
7. 105 S. Ct. 5 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers), denying stay sub nom. AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36
Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984).
8. 105 S. Ct. 13 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers), denying stay sub nom. State ex reL Harper
v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826 (Mont. 1984).
9. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984).
10. Id. at 692-94, 686 P.2d at 612-13, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93. The California court's
unusually swift decision was reached only days after the filing of the original complaint. Id at
717-18, 686 P.2d at 630, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
11. The California court stated, "[o]n March 18, 1984, respondent Secretary of State cer-
tified that the proposed initiative had received sufficient signatures to appear on the November
1984 ballot." 36 Cal. 3d at 694, 686 P.2d at 613, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 93. Art. II, § 8(b) of the
California Constitution provides that "[a]n initiative measure may be proposed by presenting
to the Secretary of State a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amend-
ment to the Constitution and is certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5
percent in the case of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution,
of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gnbernatorial election."
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held that the initiative violated both the state12 and federal constitu-
tions. 13 Interpreting Article V of the federal Constitution, 14 the court
ruled that the right of application by the "Legislatures of the several
States" does not extend to the direct action of the polity by initiative, 5
nor to a "rubber stamp legislature" compelled to act.16 The court also
held that because the initiative proposed neither a state statute nor a state
constitutional amendment, it exceeded the scope of the initiative power
granted under the California Constitution. 7 The petition for a stay of
the California court's writ of mandate was denied by Justice Rehnquist,
who reasoned that although the "federal questions [involving Article V]
are important and by no means settled... [w]e have long held that we
will not review state court decisions such as this, largely for the reason
that decisions on the federal questions in such cases would amount to no
more than advisory opinions."'" Because the California Supreme Court
relied on the California Constitution as an independent and adequate ba-
sis for its decision, the United States Supreme Court's review of the fed-
eral questions could not affect the outcome of the case. 9
In a parallel case, Montanans for a Balanced Federal Budget Com-
mittee v. Harper,20 Justice Rehnquist refused to stay a mandate of the
Supreme Court of Montana that prohibited the placement of a "Balanced
Federal Budget" initiative on Montana's November 1984 ballot.
Although the denial of stay was issued in advance of the Montana
Supreme Court's opinion,2' Justice Rehnquist observed that the Mon-
tana court's per curiam order had stated that not only did the initiative
violate Article V, but that the initiative "independently and separately
[is] facially invalid under the Montana Constitution."22 Justice Rehn-
quist reasoned, "The Montana Supreme Court has rested its decision on
the Montana Constitution, and it is the final authority as to the meaning
12. 36 Cal. 3d at 715, 686 P.2d at 628, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
13. Id. at 707, 686 P.2d at 622, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
14. U.S. CONsT. art. V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amend-
ments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratifica-
tion may be proposed by the Congress ....
15. 36 Cal. 3d at 703, 686 P.2d at 620, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
16. Id. at 706, 686 P.2d at 622, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
17. Id. at 715-16, 686 P.2d at 628, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
18. Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 105 S. Ct. 5, 6 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers), denying stay sub nom.
AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984).
19. Id.
20. 105 S. Ct. 13 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers), denying stay sub nom. State ex reL Harper
v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826 (Mont. 1984).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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of that instrument. Accordingly, for the same reasons given in Uher, the
application for a stay is denied."23
At first blush, this reasoning appears almost too obvious to be chal-
lenged. In most instances state supreme courts are certainly the ultimate
arbiters of their state constitutions. "24 However, the cursory "state's
rights" approach25 of both Uhler and Harper holds potentially far reach-
ing consequences for future Article V litigation and, more importantly,
for the amendment process itself.26
II. Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Independent State
Grounds Doctrine
A. The Power of Review
The jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is of both con-
stitutional and statutory creation. Article III of the Constitution vests
the federal judicial authority in the United States Supreme Court and in
other inferior courts established by Congress.27 Section Two of Article
III extends this power to "all cases.., arising under this Constitution
[and] the Laws of the United States."2 Congress has further defined the
scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court deci-
sions. The appellate review power is available when a state court has
ruled a treaty or a federal statute unconstitutional,29 or upheld a state
statute against a federal constitutional challenge.3 0 The Court will exer-
cise its appellate review power when it finds that a "substantial federal
23. Id.
24. See, eg., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360, 368 (1976) ("We pause finally to reaffirm the independent nature of the California Consti-
tution and our responsibility to separately define and protect the rights of California citizens
despite conflicting decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Con-
stitution."); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975);
State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa.
244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). Of course, state courts may not construe
their own constitutions in a way that violates the federal Constitution. See Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 605 n.1 (1981).
See also infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
25. As Dean Sandalow stated, "[A]ny expansion of the jurisdiction of federal courts is an
occasion for alarm for those to whom the slogan 'state's rights' is a substitute for analysis."
Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals For a Revised Doc-
trine, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 187, 187.
26. See infra note 118.
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) (1982).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982).
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question" is presented. 31  The Court's power of discretionary review
through a grant of certiorari is available whenever the validity of a state
or federal statute is questioned "on the ground of its being repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title,
right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Con-
stitution, treaties or statutes of... the United States."'32
As early as 1796 the Supreme Court had ruled that it had the power
to determine the validity of a state law when it conflicted with federal
law.33 In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee the Court established its power to
review state court determinations of federal law.34 The issue before the
Court was the Virginia court's holding unconstitutional section twenty-
five of the Judiciary Act, which gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over
state court rulings on federal questions. In the underlying dispute, the
successors in interest to a British subject and the state of Virginia both
claimed title to land located in Virginia. The state argued that as a mat-
ter of Virginia law the land had escheated before the effective dates of
federal treaties protecting British property rights. 35 The Supreme Court
reversed the Virginia court's judgment for the state and confirmed the
British titles. On remand the state court refused to obey the Supreme
31. Although appeal is often considered to guarantee mandatory plenary review, it does
not. The Court may consider the merits of the case, but in most circumstances it will summa-
rily dismiss the appeal for lack of a "substantial federal question" without receiving briefs or
hearing oral argument. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959); see also
Note, The Supreme Court Dismissal of State Court Appeals for Want of a Substantial Federal
Question, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 749 (1982).
The Judiciary Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 258, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726, together with the
Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 415, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-94 (1982)), made the Court's appellate jurisdiction discretionary rather than
mandatory in a wide range of cases. Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court: Reflections on the Laws and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1043, 1049 (1977). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT 211-16, 265-66 (1928).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982).
33. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (state law confiscating British owned
property in Virginia nullified by Treaty of Peace of 1783 between United States and Great
Britain).
34. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
35. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 625-27 (1812).
Although the vesting of title was a matter of state law, the Court held that no divestment had
occurred. The Court did not explain why the Virginia decision did not rest on an adequate
and independent state ground. See Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv.
943, 954 n.43 (1965); but see Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 631-
32 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Although Justice Johnson agreed with the Virginia court that title
had passed prior to the effective date of the treaty, he concurred with the majority that the
Supreme Court must review this determination: "[Tihe title of the parties litigant must neces-
sarily be enquired into, and.., such an enquiry must, in the nature of things, precede the
consideration how far the law, treaty, and soforth, is applicable to it; otherwise an appeal to
this Court would be worse than nugatory." Id. at 632. See Wechsler, supra note 31, at 1051-
52.
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Court's mandate, arguing that the Supreme Court had no constitutional
power to review state court decisions.36
The case once again came before the Supreme Court, which again
reversed the Virginia court. Confirming the Supreme Court's power to
review state court judgments, Justice Story wrote that "[t]he constitution
has presumed.., that state attachments, state prejudices and state inter-
ests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or
control, the regular administration of justice. ' 37 He argued, "If there
were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judg-
ments .... the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States
would be different, in different states.... [A]ppellate jurisdiction must
continue to be the only adequate remedy for such evils." 38
B. The Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds
The one hundred years following ratification of the Constitution saw
few Supreme Court decisions analyze the independent state grounds doc-
trine.39 In keeping with the Marshall Court's dirigist political theory, the
Court asserted the supremacy of federal law," often even in the face of
36. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 7 (1813), rev'd, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
37. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 347.
38. Id. at 348. See also Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). Only five years
after the decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Virginia again challenged the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court over state court decisions, arguing that the Court's appellate juris-
diction extended only to cases decided in lower federal courts. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821). Chief Justice Marshall vigorously rejected this argument: "The mischie-
vous consequences of the construction contended for on the part of Virginia... would pros-
trate ... the government and its laws at the feet of every State in the Union." Id. at 385. See
generally Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts,
1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 681-701 (1982) (discussing Marshall Court's review of
state court decisions). Justice Story's argument in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee for the necessity
of Supreme Court appellate authority remains as true today as it was in 1816. It is doubtful,
for instance, that the gains of the civil rights movement would have been possible without this
power. See, eg., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marbur' v. Madison for the
"basic principle" of our constitutional system that the federal judiciary is "supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution"). See also Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule
of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 387. Some of Justice Story's lan-
guage was overly broad, however. He argued that Congress was required by Article III to
authorize Supreme Court review of state court decisions. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 331. This
argument was unnecessary, since Congress already had given the Court that power statutorily.
See Currie, supra, at 682-87.
39. See Hill, supra note 35, at 953-54.
40. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (upholding supremacy of
federal power to regulate commerce); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(upholding the power of Congress to charter a national bank, rejecting a restrictive view of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, and striking a state tax as an interference with the exercise of a
valid federal action); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the
nationalist predominance of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court). See gener-
ally G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL's DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (1969).
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an arguably independent state ground.4 1 Although the supremacy of fed-
eral law was clearly intended by the framers,4 2 it was not a settled polit-
ical issue,43 and the competing theory-that the states enjoyed equal
constitutional status with the federal government-gained limited ac-
ceptance with the advent of the Taney Court.'
Accommodation to this dual federalism theory may have led the
Court in Murdock v. City of Memphis45 to give the doctrine of independ-
American nationalism was Marshall's "one and only great conception, and the fostering of it
the purpose of his life .... " 4 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 1 (1919). See
infra note 42.
41. See, eg., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
For a discussion of the "sub silentio" treatment of the arguably independent state ground in
cases of this era, see Hill, supra note 35, at 954-55 n.43. Professor Hill suggests several reasons
for the late enunciation of the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine, including the
unavailability of state court records on Supreme Court review and the later development of
case law more conducive to the assertion of the doctrine. Id. See Rector v. Ashley, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 142, 148 (1867).
42. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, in ESSAYS IN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (R.
McCloskey ed. 1962):
It was quite plainly the intention of the Federal Convention that National laws,
otherwise constitutional except for being in conflict with State laws, should invaria-
bly prevail over the latter; or, as Madison later phrased the matter, State power
should be "no ingredient of national power." This was also Marshall's theory. In-
deed, the principle of "national supremacy" was in his estimation the most funda-
mental axiom of constitutional interpretation touching the federal relationship ....
Id. at 199. See also P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at 203 ("As a matter of legal history
it is not difficult to justify U.S. Supreme Court review of state court decisions on issues of
federal law."); R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 61, 63-64 (1960) (the Mar-
shall Court repeatedly asserted its federal authority over the states). This is not to suggest that
the framers vested in the Supreme Court the power of review over cases decided on purely
state law grounds. See Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74
HARv. L. REV. 1375, 1375 & n.2 (1961); but ef St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780 n.9 (1981). The Supreme Court in St Martin determined
that the state court analysis did not rest on any independent and adequate state ground, even
though the court was construing a state statute. The Court stated:
We therefore are at liberty to review this judgment, although, literally it concerns the
construction of a state statute. While the South Dakota courts remain free to con-
strue the State's own law differently, they deserve to be made aware of the proper,
and here, significant interpretation of the intertwined federal law.
Id.
43. The period prior to the Civil War saw several political attempts to limit the Supreme
Court's authority over acts of the states. P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at 208; R.
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 42, at 64.
44. Corwin, supra note 42, at 200-01. The "states' rights" theory of dual federalism as-
serted that because the states created the Union under the Constitution, the powers of the
national government could not encroach upon state sovereignty, and thus the state and na-
tional governments faced each other as equals. Id. at 200. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 113, 126 (1870). For an excellent summary of the many different perceptions of the
concept of American federalism, including the "dual federalism" of the Taney and Waite
Courts, see Wisdom, supra note 2.
45. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
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ent state grounds a "constitutional resonance."46 The Court stated that
although the case presented a federal issue, the Court was not statutorily
authorized to review the state law issues decided by the state court.47
The constitutional roots of the jurisdictional bar found in Murdock are
suggested by the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III, which
prohibits advisory opinions.48 The Court repeated this suggestion in
Herb v. Pitcairn:49
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the prin-
ciple that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest on
adequate and independent state grounds. The reason is so obvious
46. Id. at 626, 633. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 120, 301 (1978).
47. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 633, 635-36. The dissent argued that Article III "declares that
the judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority-not to all questions, but
to all cases." Id. at 641 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
48. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) ("The controversy
must be... a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a
conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts."). See also Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (N.D. IM. 1974).
Because Article III limits jurisdiction to cases raising a federal question, state law ques-
tions raised in such cases are also within the power of federal jurisdiction. See United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). As a general rule, however, the Supreme Court
reviews only federal questions when it reviews decisions of a state court, and will not do so if
the state judgment rests on adequate and independent state grounds. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. at 125-26.
Although the Court has characterized Article III as the source of this limitation, some
scholars have found fault with this rationale. Sandalow, supra note 25, at 201 ("Although
Herb v. Pitcairn contains overtones of constitutional or statutory limitations on the assertion of
jurisdiction by the Court, commentators have generally agreed that refusal to review a federal
question where the judgment is based upon an adequate state ground rests upon a self-imposed
rule of judicial administration.") (footnotes omitted); P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at
213 (By deciding a federal issue when the state decision rested on an alternative adequate and
independent state ground, "the federal decision is more like a moot decision rather than an
advisory one, for the case is a concrete controversy. While the Court has called mootness a
constitutional requirement, it has also been more willing to relax the requirement in the public
interest .... ") (footnotes omitted). See Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1332 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments-State Constitutions]. See also infra note 56; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 n.40 (1963)
(specifically referring to but not endorsing the constitutional justification in Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. at 125-26; but see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 466-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that jurisdictional limitation is constitutionally mandated); Note, The Untenable Nonfederal
Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HARV. L. Rav. 1375, 1379 (1961); cf Sandalow, supra note
25, at 188-89 (arguing that it is of little consequence whether the Constitution compelled the
result in Murdock-which held that the presence of a federal question did not confer on the
Court a general power to decide all questions presented-because the principles of Murdock
"are so deeply imbedded in our law that it may fairly be deemed a part of our 'working Consti-
tution.' " (footnote omitted)). However, Dean Sandalow has pointed out another shortcoming
of the advisory opinion rationale: "It does not speak to the questions which state grounds are
adequate or how that is to be determined." Rather, it addresses only "the appropriate disposi-
tion of the case once it is determined that the state ground is adequate." Id. at 197-98.
49. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
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that it has rarely been thought to warrant statement. It is found in
the partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial sys-
tems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only
power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that
they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to cor-
rect wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not permit-
ted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would
be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of fed-
eral laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advi-
sory opinion.5 °
Despite these hints of a constitutional source for the independent
and adequate state grounds doctrine, the better view is that the doctrine
is a self-imposed rule of judicial administration created by the Supreme
Court."1 The Court has the constitutional and statutory authority to re-
view any state court decision that raises a federal question.52 Thus,
although the rule is often stated that the Court may not interfere with a
decision based on an adequate state ground,53 if a case raises a question
within the Court's jurisdiction, the Court may examine any nonfederal
-ground upon which the lower decision may have rested to determine
whether it is adequate to support the state court judgment. 54
Not only has the Court never clearly identified the source of the
independent and adequate state grounds rule, it has never clearly defined
the circumstances in which it will find exceptions to this self-imposed
restraint.55 The Court recently acknowledged that the rules governing
the application of the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine
are often obscure: "[W]e openly admit that we have thus far not devel-
oped a satisfying and consistent approach for resolving this vexing issue
.... "56 Michigan v. Long partially resolved the difculty, holding that
50. Id. at 125-26 (citations omitted).
51. See supra note 48. See also M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 205 (adequate state ground
doctrine is judicially established limitation).
52. U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). See Developments-State Constitutions,
supra note 48, at 1332.
53. E.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296
U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672, 677 (1913); Eustis v. Bolles, 150
U.S. 361, 366 (1893).
54. See, eg., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 583 (1969) ("The issue whether a federal
question was sufficiently and properly raised in the state courts is itself ultimately a federal
question, as to which [the] Court is not bound by the decision of the state courts.").
55. See Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 111 & n.80
(1959) (To permit the Supreme Court to reexamine and revise a state ground of decision
"would be unsettling one of the foundation stones in the existing structure of analysis of [the
Court's] jurisdiction to review state-court judgments." To do so "really would put an end to
the federal system as hitherto understood.").
56. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983). Although Justice O'Connor in Michi-
gan v. Long used the "avoidance of advisory opinions" language, she added that "[t]here may
be certain circumstances in which clarification is necessary or desirable, and we will not be
foreclosed from taking the appropriate action." Id. at 1041 n.6.
398 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 13:389
Supreme Court review of a state court decision is precluded when "the
state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively
based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds .... "I'
The first question then is whether the state court clearly identified the
state grounds as separate on "the face of the opinion."58 The second
issue is whether the state ground is a bona fide adequate ground for the
decision. The disposition in Michigan v. Long turned only on the first
question, since the Court found that the presumption in favor of Supreme
Court review was not overcome through a clear statement of independent
state grounds in the state court opinion.5 9 Thus, although Michigan v.
Long offers a more consistent approach to the question of how the
Supreme Court will read state court opinions to find independent state
grounds,60 it left unanswered the much more difficult issue: when does
the determination of a state law issue provide an "adequate" state ground
when a federal question is also raised?
C. When Is a State Ground "Adequate"?
Perhaps because "questions of jurisdiction [are] questions of power
57. Id. at 1041.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1043. See id. at 1042 n.8.
60. Justice O'Connor has emphasized the need for clear rules in a number of contexts.
See Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 389, 396
n.18, 402 n.49 (1985), and the opinions cited therein.
Before the Court's enunciation in Michigan v. Long of its presumption favoring review of
state court decisions, the question of the independence of the nonfederal ground from the
federal ground was problematic only when the state court either issued no opinion, see, eg.,
Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541 (1952); Dixon v. Duffy, 342 U.S. 33 (1951); Lynch v.
New York ex rel Pierson, 293 U.S. 52 (1934), or an ambiguous opinion, see, e.g., Black v.
Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Minnesota v.
National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940). Prior to Michigan v. Long, the Court often presumed
that a decision rested on an adequate state ground if one were available. See, e.g., Stembridge
v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1952); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Oklahoma, 303 U.S.
206, 212-13 (1938); Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54 (1934); Bachtel v.
Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 41-42 (1907); De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U.S. 216, 233-34 (1888);
Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257 (1871). See also P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND,
M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 41 (4th ed. 1977). The Court fashioned
several means to obtain enlightenment when state court decisions contained an incomplete or
ambiguous record. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (on Court's own motion the
petitioner ordered to obtain clarification from the state court); Minnesota v. National Tea Co.,
309 U.S. 551 (1940) (judgment vacated and remanded for clarification). See also Department
of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1965) ("While the ambiguity of the
opinion might normally lead us to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improxidently granted, we
think the preferable course is to leave the way open for obtaining clarification from the Califor-
nia Supreme Court .... "). Although less true in recent decades, the Court frequently summa-
rily dismissed appeals exhibiting ambiguous grounds of decision. See, eg., New York ex rel.
Doyle v. Atwell, 261 U.S. 590 (1923); Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300 (1890). See generally
Note, Supreme Court Treatment of State Court Cases Exhibiting Ambiguous Grounds of Deci-
sion, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 822, 835-48 (1962).
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as between the United States and the several States, ' 61 the Supreme
Court has traditionally been reluctant to establish a definitive test for
what constitutes adequate state grounds62 and has directly examined the
problem only infrequently.63 When it does address the issue, the Court
repeatedly insists that it applies "settled principles" to determine the
inadequacy of state grounds; but scholars examining the cases have been
hard pressed to identify those principles.
65
The underlying interest in finding a state ground adequate to sup-
port the judgment is the need to preclude Supreme Court review when
review would unjustifiably intrude on the sovereignty of the state and the
power of the state court to determine state law. The doctrine reaches its
limit, however, when the federal interest is so important that it justifies
the intrusion on state sovereignty.66 This limit arises in two types of
cases that present both state and federal issues. First, the state court
decision may turn on a logically antecedent state issue that necessarily
precludes reaching the federal issue.67 In these cases, the antecedent
state issue usually-but not necessarily- involves a failure to comply
61. 2 THE LIFE AND WRrrINGS OF B.R. CURTIS 341 (Curtis ed. 1879); Sandalow, supra
note 25, at 187.
62. See supra note 55; cf M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 216-31 (discussing the numerous
approaches, exceptions, and explanations for the adequate state grounds doctrine).
63. When confronted with an adequate state ground issue, the Court has frequently
merely repeated conclusory language of an earlier case. See Hill, supra note 35, at 944; cf
Sandalow, supra note 25, at 188-89 (the independent state grounds doctrine of Murdock "has
not been seriously questioned for nearly a century") (footnote omitted).
64. See, eg., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452 (1965); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S.
226, 230 (1904); Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 366 (1893).
65. See Hill, supra note 35, at 944; Sandalow, supra note 25, at 196-97:
[T]he Court's ... curious insistence that the standard for determining adequacy
stated in the opinion "will not inevitably lead to a plethora of attacks on the applica-
tion of state procedural rules," [Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 448 n.3] [is] a
reassurance which would hardly have been necessary if the Court contemplated
merely the application of "settled principles."
66. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). The proposition of Marbury-that the Supreme Court is the
ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of federal statutes-requires the corollary conclusion
that state court rulings on federal matters must also be subject to federal judicial review. P.
HAY & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at 204-05 (1982). In addition to the nationalizing interest
served by the supremacy of federal law established in Marbury and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
other interests may be served when the Supreme Court reviews state court decisions. In the
context of antecedent state issues, the Court always faces the defeat of a federal claim and must
balance the state's interest in the substance of the federal interest against the state procedural
requirement or substantive determination that defeats the federal claim. See, eg., Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (discussed infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text). When a
separate "independent" state issue is the foundation of a state court decision involving a fed-
eral claim, the federal interest is not necessarily defeated, and the Court will examine whether
the state court protection of the state interest exceeds the boundaries of the federally defined
federal interest. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
67. See, eg., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 512 n.7 (1978).
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with state procedural rules.6" Whether the antecedent state ground insu-
lates the federal issue from review depends on the nature of the state
ground and the importance of the federal issue. Second, the state court
may base its decision on state substantive grounds wholly separate from
the federal issue presented. Here, the rationale for finding an independ-
ent state ground is often stated as the desire to avoid advisory opinions.69
But notwithstanding the clarity of a state court opinion on the indepen-
dence of its state court ruling, state law may be inadequate to supply an
independent rule of decision-for instance, when federal constitutional
violations are sanctioned on state grounds.
1. Antecedent State Issues
The federal Constitution provides a minimum threshold of protec-
tion to which every citizen is entitled, and a state cannot enforce its own
laws when they conflict with the minimum protections guaranteed by
federal law.7 ° However, state procedural rules, such as statutes of limita-
tion,7 1 laches,72 rules for perfecting appeal,7 3 and rules of pleading,74 may
be legitimate prerequisites to the protection of federal rights.75 When are
these antecedent state grounds inadequate to preclude review of the fed-
eral issue? In Davis v. Wechsler 76 the Court recognized:
68. See infra note 89.
69. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117,125-26 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296
U.S. 207, 210 (1935). See also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (advisory opin-
ion justification for the doctrine has "no application where the state ground is purely
procedural").
70. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940) ("The
States cannot, in the exercise of control over local laws and practice, vest state courts with
power to violate the supreme law of the land.").
71. See, e.g., Elder v. Wood, 208 U.S. 226, 233 (1908); Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300,
307-09 (1890).
72. See, e.g., Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 111 (1934).
73. See, e.g., Monger v. Florida, 405 U.S. 958 (1972), denying cert. to 249 So.2d 433 (Fla.
1971). See also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 512 n.7 (1978) (state supreme court may
refuse to consider federal issue when petitioner failed to argue the federal issue in state trial
court and appellate court as required by state procedural rule); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 264 n.4 (1964) (Supreme Court review of due process objection to jurisdiction is
foreclosed by ruling of the state court that petitioner failed to preserve its objection under state
procedure when it entered a general appearance).
74. See, e.g., Wilson v. Loew's, Inc., 355 U.S. 597, 598 (1958) (per curium); Ellis v.
Dixon, 249 U.S. 458, 463-64 (1955).
75. In John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583 (1913), the Court stated:
Without any doubt it rests with each State to prescribe the jurisdiction of its appel-
late courts, the mode and... practice to be applied in its exercise; and the state law
and practice in this regard are no less applicable when Federal rights are in contro-
versy than when the case turns entirely upon questions of local or general law.
Id. at 585.
76. 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
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Whatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring
to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal
rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated
under the name of local practice .... [I]t is necessary to see that
local practice shall not be allowed to put unreasonable obstacles in
the way.7 7
Although this passage has often been cited as an explication of the
adequacy principles, it fails to shed much light on the proper standard.78
The Court has described an inadequate state ground as one which is "so
unfair or unreasonable in its application to those asserting a federal right
77. Id. at 24-25. Before Davis, the Court in Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904), had
announced as a "necessary and well settled rule that the exercise ofjurisdiction by this court to
protect constitutional rights cannot be declined when it is plain that the fair result of a decision
is to deny the rights." Id. at 230. The Court continued:
It is well known that this court will decide for itself whether a contract was made as
well as whether the obligation of the contract has been impaired. Jefferson Branch
Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436, 443. But that is merely an illustration of a more general
rule. On the same ground there can be no doubt that if full faith and credit were
denied to a judgment rendered in another State upon a suggestion of want ofjurisdic-
tion, without evidence to warrant the finding, this court would enforce the constitu-
tional requirement.
Id. at 230-31.
The Court in Rogers v. Alabama reversed an Alabama state court decision that had up-
held the denial of a motion to quash an indictment for murder. The state court had ignored
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim of the defendant, who was black, and who
alleged that blacks had been systematically excluded from the grand jury. Id. at 229. The
state court had upheld the striking of the motion to quash, which was two pages long, under its
state law power to strike "any pleading [that] is unnecessarily prolix." Id. at 230.
In Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932), the Court stated:
[Tihe Constitution, which guarantees rights and immunities to the citizen, likewise
insures to him the privilege of having those rights and immunities judicially declared
and protected when such judicial action is properly invoked. Even though the
claimed constitutional protection be denied on non-Federal grounds, it is the prov-
ince of this Court to inquire whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair
or substantial basis.
Id. at 282. As Professor Tribe has suggested, this reasoning indicates that the Supreme Court's
constitutional authority to override state court barriers to its exercise of Article III jurisdiction
does not derive from Article III, but from the substantive character of the claim asserted. L.
TRIBE, supra note 6, at 123 1978).
78. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4027, at 741 (1977); Hill, supra note 35, at 944 (this passage
from Davis "is quoted more often than any other as expressive of the applicable principle").
Some 20 years ago, Professor Hill blamed the general insufficiency of doctrinal development in
this area partly on the fact that this passage from Davis "represents one of the fuller explica-
tions of the Supreme Court on the subject." Id. Notwithstanding the Court's effort in Michi-
gan v. Long, discussed supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text, the last twenty years has seen
little clarification of the standards of adequacy, despite the expansion of the use of independent
state grounds by state courts, see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977); Galie, Judicial Activism Among State Supreme
Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 740 (1982); Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions
of a Federal Judge, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 181-88 (1984); see generally Develop-
ments-State Constitutions, supra note 48, at 1394-1408, 1442, 1459-63.
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as to obstruct it,"79 or "so certainly unfounded that it properly may be
regarded as essentially arbitrary, or a mere device to prevent review of
the decision upon the federal question."8 The Court has found state
grounds insufficient to deny the claim of a federal right when the proce-
dural requirements imposed were inconsistent with previous state court
holdings,81 the record suggested intentional evasion by the state court of
the federal claim,82 and when the state court action "denied to the plain-
tiff due process of law-using that term in its primary sense of an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to defend its substantive right.""
However, the Court's willingness to decline jurisdiction is clearly
not limited to cases in which a state intentionally evades federal rights or
the proceeding itself is a denial of due process.84 In Williams v. Geor-
gia, 85 a discretionary state procedural rule allowed the state trial court to
grant a motion for a new trial after the verdict. The trial court denied
the motion and the Supreme Court concluded that the state court's re-
fusal to exercise its discretion "is, in effect, an avoidance of the federal
right."
8 6
The Supreme Court in Henry v. Mississippi87 reviewed a state court
judgment which had affirmed a criminal conviction despite the introduc-
tion of evidence obtained through an illegal search. Defendant's counsel,
who had failed to make a timely objection to the evidence as required by
79. Central Union Tel. Co. v. City of Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195 (1925).
80. Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917).
81. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Underlying the Court's
decision was the suspicion that the newly fashioned procedural rule employed by the Alabama
court to defeat the federal right served no legitimate state interest and was designed to hinder
the assertion of federally protected rights. Id. at 457, 466. See also James v. Kentucky, 466
U.S. 341, 348-49 (1984) (state distinction between jury admonitions and jury instructions "is
not the sort of firmly established and regularly followed state practice that can prevent imple-
mentation of federal constitutional rights."); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982)
(failure to comply with state procedural rule may constitute an independent and adequate state
ground, but a state procedural rule is not adequate unless it is strictly or regularly followed);
Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964) (same).
82. See, eg., Ward v. Board of County Comn'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1920); see also
Nickel v. Cole, 256 U.S. 222, 225 (1921); Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93, 99 (1907); Johnson v.
Risk, 137 U.S. 300, 307 (1890).
83. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930).
84. Even in cases in which the state ground involves a procedural default that denies a
litigant's fair opportunity to be heard on his federal claim, the Court has rarely invoked the
Due Process Clause to support its holding. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 124-25; Hill, supra
note 35, at 959-60.
85. 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
86. Id. at 383. See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1969)
(notice requirement, "more properly deemed discretionary than jurisdictional, does not bar
review ... by certiorari"). See also Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 191-92 (1960)
(independent state procedural ground that bound state appellate court to evidence in the rec-
ord and thus defeated the federal claim held valid as a nondiscretionary state rule).
87. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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state law, instead had waited until the end of trial and then requested a
directed verdict."8 The Supreme Court stated that "a litigant's proce-
dural defaults in state proceedings do not prevent vindication of his fed-
eral rights unless the State's insistence on compliance with its procedural
rule serves a legitimate state interest. 81 9 The Court found that although
the contemporaneous objection rule "clearly does serve a legitimate state
interest" to avoid delay in the case, that interest was equally well served
by allowing the objection at the end of trial.90 In effect, the Court bal-
anced the federal and state interests and found that the state interests
could be substantially served through a procedure less prejudicial to the
assertion of the federal claim.91
Henry v. Mississippi portended an increase in the Supreme Court's
scrutiny of state procedures affecting the assertion of federal claims.92
Although this generally has not proven to be the case,93 one commenta-
88. Id. at 444-46.
89. Id. at 447. The Court distinguished adequacy of procedural grounds from adequacy
of state substantive grounds. Id. This distinction has been criticized as a "patent analytical
defect." Wechsler, supra note 31, at 1054:
State court rulings on substantive state questions obviously may prevent "the imple-
mentation" of a federal right no less than state procedural determinations, witness
the title issue in the Hunter case, the contract issue when impairment is asserted, the
property issue when a deprivation without due process is claimed .... [T]he point is
simply that the existence, application or implementation of a federal right turns on
the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state law.
Id. Indeed, the Court has acknowledged this very point. See Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226,
230-31 (1904) (discussed supra note 77). See also Sandalow, supra note 25, at 197 (arguing
that both state procedural and substantive law determinations may defeat a federal right and in
either case the Supreme Court must determine for itself whether a federal right has actually
been violated).
90. 379 U.S. at 448-49. Because the Court found it unclear whether the accused had
deliberately waived his objection to the evidence, it vacated the conviction and remanded for a
rehearing on that issue. Id. at 446.
91. For a discussion of this balancing test prior to its application in Henry v. Mississippi,
see Note, supra note 48, at 1388-91 (1961).
92. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 127.
93. See Wechsler, supra note 89, at 1055 ("The decisions... [since Henry] do not dispel
the possibility that [Henry] is merely being treated with intelligent neglect."). See also J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98 (2d ed. 1983). But see Monger
v. Florida, 405 U.S. 958, 962 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by
Brennan & Stewart, JJ.) (urging acceptance of certiorari and reversal of state court decision as
inadequate ground to bar federal claim).
The Burger Court has been criticized for using jurisdictional doctrines selectively to nul-
lify what some commentators view as states' attempts to increase state constitutional protec-
tions of individual rights in an era in which federal protections are being restricted. See
Nichol, An Activism ofAmbivalence (Book Review), 98 HARV. L. REV. 315 (1984). However,
much of this criticism has been directed at the Court's majority for finding that a state court
decision was not placed on independent state grounds, not that clearly stated independent
grounds were inadequate. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part); 463 U.S. at 1065-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause:
Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L.
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tor has asserted that there is no reason to believe that Henry's "legitimate
state interest" test has been abandoned.94 It should be remembered,
however, that the court in Henry found a legitimate state interest in the
state ground, but applied a least restrictive means test.95 At least in this
aspect, Henry has no apparent progeny.96
2. Independent Substantive State Grounds
If the state ground relied upon is not antecedent to the federal right,
but independent of it, the adequacy analysis necessarily differs. If the
proceeding raises both state and federal issues wholly independent from
each other, and the state court upholds the federal right, the Supreme
Court should not review the decision, even if it would have decided the
state issue differently, or even if it disagrees with the reasoning used by
the state court to uphold the federal right. In this way the state court
may use a state ground to expand a federally guaranteed right beyond the
limits of the federal right.97 However, a state court may not defeat a
federally guaranteed right by upholding a right independently guaran-
teed under state law.
For example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,98 shopping
Rnv. 625, 648 n. 125 (1985); Comment, Michigan v. Long: Presumptive Federal Appellate Ju-
risdiction over State Cases Containing Ambiguous Grounds of Decision, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1081
(1984).
94. M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 231.
95. 379 U.S. at 448.
96. Although the Court has infrequently addressed the independent and adequate state
ground problem since its decision in Henry, M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 231, several cases
have failed to cite Henry when a broad reading of Henry would have indicated opposite results.
See Monger v. Florida, 405 U.S. 958 (1972), denying cert to 249 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1971) (hold-
ing state ground adequate when state supreme court dismissed defendent's appeal as improp-
erly taken because it was filed before entry of written judgment although after oral
pronouncement); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (holding state ground ade-
quate when defendent failed to object to grand jury compostion prior to entry of guily plea, as
required by state rule); Johnson v. New Jersy, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (holding state rule preclud-
ing reconsideration of issue adjudicated in prior litigation adequate to bar that issue on
Supreme Court review of state post-conviction proceedings). Other post-Henry cases have
failed to cite it when it would have supported the decision. See Parrot v. Talahassee, 381 U.S.
129 (1965) (failure to obtain certification of lower court record for review in higher state court
held not an adequate state ground); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (failure to con-
tinuously raise objection already rejected to prosecution's piecemeal reading of an accomplice's
confession not an adequate state ground). But see Camp v. Arkansas, 404 U.S. 69 (1971) (per
curium) (citing Henry and holding that failure to object until state court appeal was not a
procedural default that would bar Supreme Court review of the constitutional claim). Henry
has been cited for the more narrow proposition that the asserted state ground would "further
no perceivable state interest." James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 349 (1984).
97. Independent state constitutional protections do not always mean that the federal pro-
tection will be expanded. See Developments-State Constitutions, supra note 48, at 1404-08,
1411-16.
98. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
[Vol. 13:389
Winter 1986] INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS DOCTRINE 405
center owners challenged a California decision99 which had held that
state freedom of speech guarantees included the right to petition at pri-
vately owned shopping centers. Pruneyard asserted that the new Califor-
nia constitutional right to free speech at shopping centers violated the
owners' federal property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments as well as their federal free speech rights under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments."°°
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and affirmed the Cali-
fornia judgment. 10 1 The Court distinguished Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.102
"In Lloyd... there was no state constitutional or statutory provision
that had been construed to create rights to the use of private property by
strangers, comparable to those found to exist by the California Supreme
Court here." ' 3  In effect, the Supreme Court held that although the
federal Constitution does not guarantee a free speech right on privately
owned shopping centers, it does not prohibit a state constitution or stat-
ute from doing so. The Supreme Court's exercise of jurisdiction in
99. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1979).
100. 447 U.S. at 76-77. An earlier California decision, Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331,
521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974), had interpreted the state constitutional provision as
consistent with the United States Supreme Court determination that private property interests
of shopping center owners outweighed federal first amendment rights. Id. at 335, 521 P.2d at
463, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (citing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)). Despite the
similar nature of the activity-freedom of expression- protected by both the California and
the federal constitutions, the content of their respective protections differs substantially. 11
Cal. 3d at 337-38, 521 P.2d at 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The California
court acknowledged this difference when it overruled Diamond in Robins v. Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979). The difference is rooted
in the text of the two documents. The federal Constitution is a limit on governmental action
abridging freedom of expression, U.S. CONsT. amend. I, while the California guarantee pro-
tects its reasonable exercise by an individual, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (a). Thus, unlike Lloyd,
it was unnecessary to argue in Robins that the privately owned shopping center had replaced a
traditionally public function to invoke the California constitutional protection. Compare
Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden West Publishing Corp., 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 182 Cal. Rptr.
813 (1980) (giving publisher right of access to private residential community for distribution of
its uninvited complimentary newspaper when another newspaper has access by permission)
with Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (First Amendment protects freedom of speech on
streets of privately owned company town because town had become the functional equivalent
of a public municipality). For a survey of textual differences of free speech protections found
in state constitutions and the federal Constitution, see Developments-State Constitutions,
supra note 48, at 1398-1401.
101. 447 U.S. at 75-76. In an age in which unanimity among United States Supreme Court
Justices has become an infrequent occurrence, all nine Justices voted to affirm. Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Stevens, joined in pertinent part by Justice Blackmun, and joined in part by
Justices White and Powell. Id. at 74.
102. 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (finding no First Amendment guarantee to exercise freedom of
speech at privately owned shopping center).
103. 447 U.S. at 81.
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Pruneyard was permissible under the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine because the Court was examining whether the exten-
sion of the plaintiff's rights under California law violated the defendant's
federal rights. 1" In fact, the Court could have agreed with the defendant
and reversed the California judgment without violating the independent
and adequate state grounds doctrine.10 5
Would the result have changed if Lloyd had upheld a first amend-
ment right on privately owned shopping centers, and the California court
had upheld a state property right to exclude those who wished to exercise
their federal right on a privately owned shopping center? In this case
state property rights would be limited by federal first amendment
rights." 6 Despite the independence of the state property rights, the state
court decision would require defining the federally imposed limits of the
right, which is never an adequate state ground.
Thus, the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is limited
in two kinds of cases: First, if the federal right is defeated by a decision
on an antecedent state issue, the Court will examine the method by
which the state court made the determination. If the method is without
fair or substantial support or if the substantive federal interest so out-
weighs the state's purpose in the application of its procedure, the state
ground is inadequate and the Court will determine the federal issue on
the merits. Second, if the state ground is independent of the federal
claim, the Court will review the state decision if upholding the state right
lessens the protection of the federal right beneath the federal constitu-
tional minimum. In effect, this determination involves a balancing of the
strength of the federal guarantee with both the substance of the state
limitation and the interest of maintaining state autonomy in the federal
system. 107 Defining the scope of federal guarantees can never be beyond
104. No jurisdictional objection was raised.
105. In Robins, the California court could have found that although federal protections of
property rights were not violated, state protections were. See Collins, Reliance on State Consti-
tutions-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1, 9 (1981). In effect,
the holding would be that although the state protects the right of free expression on private
property, to allow it in this instance would violate state guaranteed property rights. Thus, the
decision of the state court would reach the same result as Lloyd, but for entirely different
reasons. Because the state court decision would extend the plaintiff's corollary first amend-
ment right beyond its federal floor but the state limitation is at least coextensive with the
corollary federal ceiling, no federal right would be denied by the state court judgment.
106. For a discussion in somewhat different terminology of state limits on federal protec-
tions of freedom of expression, see Developments-State Constitutions, supra note 48, at 1411-
18.
107. The Supreme Court's holding in Pruneyard could be restated as follows: Although
the Court will not in most instances extend the right of free speech to include its exercise in
violation of the property rights of shopping center owners, neither will it extend those property
rights to prohibit the exercise of freedom of speech when that freedom is guaranteed by a state
law source. Merely because the Constitution protects an interest-in this instance a property
interest-does not mean that that interest cannot be overcome by another interest subject to
Winter 1986] INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS DOCTRINE
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
M. Does the Independent and Adequate State Grounds
Doctrine Apply to State Decisions Involving Article V?
Cases involving Article V present several unique problems for the
independent and adequate state grounds doctrine. First, if, as in Uhler
and Harper, the state decision has the effect of invalidating a step in the
Article V amendment process, does the state court's remedy deny a con-
stitutionally guaranteed right? This requires an examination of the scope
of the right guaranteed by Article V. If the state judgment denies a
claim of an Article V guarantee, the independent state grounds doctrine
is inapplicable unless (1) the state determination is on an antecedent state
ground that serves a legitimate state purpose or (2) the determination on
the independent state issue is not in conflict with the boundaries of fed-
eral protection. The state decisions in Uhler and Harper certainly were
not placed on antecedent state issues. Unlike the decisions in NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson and Henry v. Mississippi, which did not reach
the federal issue because of the failure to follow state procedural rules,108
the California and Montana courts ruled that the state initiatives violated
state constitutional provisions wholly independent of Article V. Accord-
ingly, only the independent state issue analysis of adequacy is involved in
Uhler and Harper.
Second, even if a state court decision is placed on state grounds that
do not abridge the federally guaranteed right, independent state grounds
in the context of Article V litigation requires an additional examination:
is the amendatory power guaranteed by Article V a power reserved by
the states under the Tenth Amendment as part of state sovereignty, or
one delegated to them by Article V itself?. If the sole source of authority
to participate in the Article V amendment process flows from the Consti-
tution to a state by virtue of the state's explicitly subordinate function as
a member of the United States, 10 9 the state retains no sovereign authority
to limit that amendatory power on an "independent" state basis.
state law protection. But see Comment, California Diminishes Federally Protected Constitu-
tionalRights-Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 2 WHrrrIER L. REV. 423, 435-39 (1980),
arguing that the California court impermissibly diminished federally guaranteed property
rights in violation of the Supremacy Clause. This argument is valid only if the California court
had attempted to insulate its decision by way of the independent state grounds doctrine. Be-
cause the United States Supreme Court had the final say on the extent of the federal protec-
tion, no Supremacy Clause problem is presented.
108. See supra notes 81, 87-91 and accompanying text.
109. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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A. The "Adequate Grounds" Requirement: Was a Federal Right
Abridged?
Article V provides a two-step amendment process: one for propos-
ing amendments and one for ratifying them. 110 The Applications Clause
of Article V gives two alternate but parallel1" means of proposing
amendments: (1) upon the assent of two-thirds of both houses of Con-
gress; or (2) by convention called "on the Application of the Legislatures
of two-thirds of the several States.""112
Madison defended the proposed amendment process of Article V in
The Federalist: "That useful alterations will be suggested by experience,
could not but be foreseen.... [Article V] guards equally against that
extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and
that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults.""' 3
This captures the tension of Article V and reveals the difficulty in defin-
ing its "guarantee." On one hand, the Framers were concerned to avoid
the problems of the Articles of Confederation, under which the states
retained a paralyzing veto power. 1 4 On the other hand, the Framers
also understood that without proper procedural barriers to new amend-
ments, the Constitution could become an ineffective repository of tran-
sient political whims that could not guide the principles of law for the
nation." '5 Thus the procedural restrictions on the amendment process
110. See supra note 14.
111. Madison voiced the parallel nature of the Applications Clause in the Federalist Papers:
"Article V, moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the
amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the
other." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 286 (J. Madison) (Bicentennial ed. 1976). But see Gun-
ther, Constitutional Brinksmanship: Stumbling Toward a Convention, 65 A.B.A. J. 1046, 1047
(1979).
112. U.S. CONST. art. V.
113. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 286 (J. Madison) (Bicentennial ed. 1976).
114. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII provided: "iNior shall any alteration at any
time hereafter be made in [these Articles] ... unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress
of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State."
One of the drafters of the Constitution, Charles Pinckney, condemned the veto power of
the states under the Articles of Confederation:
[I]t is to this unanimous consent, the depressed situation of the Union is undoubtedly
owing. Had the measures recommended by Congress and assented to. some of them
by eleven and others by twelve of the States, been carried into execution, how differ-
ent would have been the complexion of Public Affairs? To this weak, this absurd
part of the Government, may all our distresses be fairly attributed.
Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government submitted to the Federal Convention, re-
printed in 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 120-21
(1911).
115. See Mathias, What's the Constitution Among Friends?, 67 A.B.A. J. 861, 862 (1981).
Since the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, over 10,000 resolutions to amend the Constitu-
tion have been introduced in the Congress and over 400 applications have been submitted by
the states for constitutional conventions. Id. Of course, only 26 of those resolutions were
successful, and no constitutional convention has been called. Those zealous for change by
408
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are part of the federal right guaranteed by Article V.
In AFL-CIO v. Eu and Harper, the state courts sought to determine
the content of the Article V guarantee. The California Supreme Court in
AFL-CIO v. Eu ruled on whether the word "Legislature" in the Applica-
tions Clause of Article V (1) encompasses the voters of a state acting
under their initiative power and (2) includes a legislature compelled to
act by reason of a state initiative resolution. As Justice Rehnquist noted,
"[t]hese federal questions are important and by no means settled .... "116
Yet he concluded that because an independent state ground could be
found, no "substantial federal question" was raised. 1 7 In effect, this
conclusion means that although the Supreme Court has not yet spoken
on many important questions raised by Article V,118 state courts may
prevent it from doing so through the use of independent state grounds.
Yet the doctrine of independent state grounds should not lead to this
result: the determination of guarantees of Article V should never be
beyond Supreme Court review. 19
amendment are seemingly undaunted by the statistical rate of failure of previous efforts. In the
first four months of the 97th Congress alone, 144 constitutional amendment resolutions were
offered. Id. at 863.
116. Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 105 S. Ct. at 6 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers), denying stay sub nom.
AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89.
117. Id.
118. Problems of Article V range from what constitutes a valid application to Congress to
what powers a convention would have if convened. See Dellinger, Con Con Con, The New
Republic, April 7, 1986, at 10; Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Convention,
99 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979); Gunther, Constitutional Brinksmanship: Stumbling Toward a Con-
vention, 65 A.B.A. 3. 1046 (1979); Noonan, The Convention Method of Constitutional Amend-
ment- Its Meaning, Usefulness, and Wisdom, 10 PAC. L.J. 641 (1979); Tribe, Issues Raised by
Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amend-
ment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627 (1979); Van Alstyn, The Limited Constitutional Convention: The Re-
curring Answer, 1979 DuKE L.J. 985.
Petitioners in Uhler argued that the Supreme Court has no role to play in adjudicating
Article V questions because they are nonjusticiable. 105 S. Ct. at 6. This argument relies upon
the plurality decision in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), in which the Court held that
the time within which a state may ratify a proposed amendment is a political question better
decided by Congress. In broad dictum four Justices asserted that "[t]he [amending] process
itself is 'political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the
Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control, or interference at any point." Id.
at 459 (Black, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas, J.J.). Justice
Rehnquist rejected petitioners expansive reading of the politcal question doctrine, which did
not command a majority in Coleman and would not be likely to do so today. 105 S. Ct. at 6.
Other Courts and commentators have reached the same conclusion as Justice Rehnquist. See
AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 698, 669 P.2d at 616, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 96, citing Idaho v.
Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Id. 1981), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 809 (1982); Dyer v. Blalr,
390 F. Supp. 1291, 1300-03 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Note, Good Intention, New Inventions, andArticle
V Constitutional Conventions, 58 TEx. L. REv. 131, 158-62 (1979).
119. See, e.g., Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1920); see also
Nickel v. Cole, 256 U.S. 222, 225 (1921); Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93, 99 (1907); Johnson v.
Risk, 137 U.S. 300, 307 (1890).
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The right of amendment is perhaps the most fundamental of all
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 120 Without it, many of what we
regard as our traditions of liberty would find no textual constitutional
foundation. Changing the language of the Constitution is at the same
time a check on the judiciary, which interprets it, and an alteration of the
fundamental principles that guide our rule of law. The interest in uni-
formity in the validity of applications is certainly as great as that interest
in the context of ratification. Indeed, confusion over what constitutes a
valid application is not merely hypothetical,1 21 and without Supreme
Court review, that confusion would possibly be endless. As Judge Wis-
dom has pointed out: "Although the substantive source of civil rights
and civil liberties lies preeminently in article V of the Constitution, the
first eight amendments, and the Civil War amendments, the predicate for
enforcement of constitutional rights lies in Madison's foresight in insist-
ing on a judiciary that would exercise a federalizing function as well as a
dispute settling function." 122 Although a state retains the power to de-
termine its own political processes, that power is limited by the need for
uniformity in the federal amendment process, which requires priority
over state interests.
B. Can Article V Decisions Ever Be Placed on State Grounds?
An additional problem arises when Article V decisions are analyzed
within the traditional independent state grounds doctrine. The central
issue that a state court faces in Article V litigation is whether Article V is
subject to state law limitations. Can a state court judgment on an Article
V issue ever be placed on an independent state ground when the state's
role in the Article V process is itself a federal function?
According to the view expressed in Uhler, the Supreme Court would
not review the state decision regardless of the state determination of the
federal issue. But what if the California court had decided the federal
issue differently-ruling that the term "Legislature" in Article V does
include action by initiative-yet reached the same judgment because it
invalidated the initiative on state grounds. Further, assume the Montana
court had upheld the claimed federal right of application for amendment
by initiative and had not found an adequate state basis for prohibiting
placement of the initiative on the state ballot. California state law would
prohibit Californians from petitioning Congress under Article V by initi-
120. See Wisdom, supra note 2, at 1077.
121. By the time AFL-CIO v. Eu was decided by the California court, 32 of the required 34
states had submitted applications to the Congress to convene a constitutional convention to
consider an amendment requiring a balanced federal budget. 36 Cal. 3d at 692, 686 P.2d at
612, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 91. These applications are far from uniform, and whether each is valid
is subject to controversy. See Dellinger, Con Con Con, supra note 118, at 10-11; Note, Is This
Any Way to Amend the Constitution, 22 ARIZ. L. REv. 1011, 1017-20 (1980).
122. Wisdom, supra note 2, at 1077.
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ative, while Montanans would be allowed to do so. The inconsistent
judgments seem difficult to justify. Although it may be proper, for in-
stance, for California state law to allow petitioners a right of free expres-
sion on California's privately owned shopping centers while Montana
denies similar access to its malls, I23 this inconsistency seems peculiar
when applied to the right of amendment of the federal Constitution.
States retain the power to legislate and adjudicate by virtue of their
sovereign status in the federal system."2 4 The Tenth Amendment, which
reserves to the states and to the people the powers not delegated by the
Constitution to the federal government, only elevated to explicit constitu-
tional status the principle of dual sovereignty already implicit in the fed-
eral system created by the Constitution. 25 Within this dual system are
powers delegated exclusively to the federal government, powers reserved
exclusively to the states, and powers shared by both the states and the
federal government.' 26 The power created under Article V is unique in
that action by the states is required to amend the federal Constitution,
but the power to amend is not within the sovereign power reserved to the
states. It is a delegated federal function.12 7 Although the Court has
never squarely ruled on the nature of the Applications Clause power of
Article V, both logic and policy indicate its exclusive federal nature.
This understanding is reflected in several analogous decisions in-
volving the Ratification Clause. The Supreme Court rejected a Tenth
Amendment argument in Hlawke v. Smith, which reversed an Ohio
Supreme Court decision that upheld state procedural obstacles to ratifi-
cation of the Eighteenth Amendment. 28 The Ohio Constitution re-
quired ratification of a proposed amendment to the federal Constitution
by both the state general assembly and by referendum.1 2 9 Although the
Amendment had already been ratified by the state legislature, the Ohio
123. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
124. Although the Tenth Amendment is the most explicit statement of the independent
sovereignty of the states, the Constitution as a whole presupposes the states' independent and
sovereign existence. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812)
("The powers of the general Government are made up of concessions from the several states-
whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve.")
125. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (the Tenth Amendment
"states but a truism .... ").
126. The precise determination of which powers are exclusive to the federal government
and the states, respectively, remains an unsettled question. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) with id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) and
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). For a discussion of the "checkered
career" of the Tenth Amendment, see Wisdom, supra note 2, at 1070 n.24. See generally L.
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 121-37 (1985).
127. See infra notes 129-137 and accompanying text.
128. 253 U.S. 221 (1920), revg 100 Ohio St. 385, 126 N.E. 400 (1919). The Court also
rejected identical objections to the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment. Hawke v. Smith
(No. 2), 253 U.S. 231 (1920).
129. 253 U.S. at 225.
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court interpreted "Legislature" in Article V to include ratification by ref-
erenda and affirmed a dismissal of an injunction to prevent the state from
submitting a referendum to the electorate.13 0
The Supreme Court not only held that the Ohio court had misinter-
preted Article V, it also ruled that Article V creates an exclusively fed-
eral power: "[T]he power to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal
Constitution has its source in the Federal Constitution. The act of ratifi-
cation by the State derives its authority from the Federal Constitution to
which the State and its people have alike assented."131I The Court re-
jected the Ohio court's view that under the Tenth Amendment a state
retains the power "to determine for itself its own political machinery and
its own domestic policies" 132 when used to carry out the federal ratifica-
tion function given by Article V. 133 "Any other view might lead to end-
less confusion in the manner of ratification of federal amendments. The
choice of means of ratification was wisely withheld from conflicting ac-
tion in the several states."' 13 4
In Leser v. Garnett 135 the Supreme Court rejected the claim that
state constitutions can override the federal amendatory power. State vot-
ers sued to require the Maryland Board of Registry to strike the names of
women from the register of voters on the grounds that the state constitu-
tion limited suffrage to men and that the Nineteenth Amendment had
not been validly adopted by several of the ratifying states. The Court
held that the Maryland Constitution could not affect the validity of a
federal constitutional provision.136 The Court then addressed the con-
tention that the Nineteenth Amendment had not been validly ratified be-
cause several state constitutional provisions or procedural restrictions
allegedly rendered the ratifications inoperative: "[T]he function of a
state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution, like the function of Congress in proposing the amendment, is a
federal function derived from the Federal Constitution; and it transcends
any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a State."137
That these cases addressed the Ratification Clause and not the Ap-
plications Clause is not a distinguishing fact. Just as the power to ratify
proposed amendments finds its source in the federal Constitution, so too
does the power to propose amendments. The ratification function of a
state is federal; the proposing function of Congress is federal; and the
application function of a state is federal. When a state participates in the
130. 100 Ohio St. at 385, 390, 126 N.E. at 400, 402.
131. 253 U.S. at 230.
132. 100 Ohio St. at 388, 126 N.E. at 403 (Wanamaker, J., concurring).
133. 253 U.S. at 230.
134. Id.
135. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
136. Id. at 136.
137. Id. at 137. See also The National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920).
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amendment of the Consitution, it acts to bind all citizens of the United
States, not just those within its authority as a sovereign. It derives this
power from the federal union itself.
Neither Hawke v. Smith nor Leser v. Garnett explicitly raised the
question of independent and adequate state grounds, but it is inconceiv-
able that these cases would have been decided differently if the state
courts had placed their decisions on independent state grounds. If the
amendment process of Article V is an exclusively "federal function...
[which] transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of
a State," '138 then only federal law may supply the rule of decision.
Conclusion
Conflict between state and national sovereignty may never be re-
solved in a system that constitutionally protects both. The Framers,
knowing the failure of the "classic federalism" '39 of the Articles of Con-
federation, which gave complete sovereignty to the states, sought to cre-
ate a new system of federalism. No one understood this better than
Madison:
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a na-
tional nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its
foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the
ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal
and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national,
not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national;
and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments,
it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national. "
The independent and adequate state grounds doctrine is the logical
extension of the unique United States system of federalism. Unbridled
United States Supreme Court review of state court decisions of state law
would mock independent state authority. Contrary to the implication of
some Supreme Court opinions, however, the doctrine of independent and
138. 258 U.S. at 137.
139. Wisdom, supra note 2, at 1075.
140. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 250 (3. Madison) (Bicentennial ed. 1976). Madison
stated that if the amendment power were wholly national in character, the majority of the
citizens of the Union would hold ultimate authority, which could be exercised to alter or
abolish the government itself. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, each state would hold
a veto power.
The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these
principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the
proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the national and advances to-
ward the federal character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole
number of States sufficient, it loses again the federal and partakes of the national
character.
Id. at 249-50 (emphasis in original). Article V accomplished this purpose by delegating to the
states as states a necesssary role in the amendment process.
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adequate state grounds is not constitutionally compelled. The Court has
recognized several circumstances in which it will overcome its self-im-
posed jurisdictional limitation and review state court decisions. If a state
court finding on a state law issue necessarily defeats the claimed federal
right, the Court will examine whether the state court finding is supported
by a legitimate state interest sufficient to defeat the federal right. If the
state court rests its decision on a wholly separate issue of state law, the
Court will not review the decision unless the state remedy abridges a
federally guaranteed right.
Article V presents unique problems for the independent and ade-
quate state grounds doctrine. Its guarantee-the freedom to amend the
Constitution, but not too freely-is not easily defined. Moreover, as
Madison recognized, the amendment process under Article V has a pecu-
liar status within our federal system. It is not wholly within the power of
the Congress, since action by the states is required. But neither is it
wholly within the power of the states. The states' function in the amend-
ment process transcends limitations imposed by the states 141 because
such limitations are beyond their sovereign power. Thus, an asserted
state ground can never be independent and adequate to insulate a state
court judgment in an Article V decision from Supreme Court review.
By David W. Thill*
141. In Uhler, Justice Rehnquist expressed the concern that acceptance of petitioner's
"political question" argument would mean
that courts... would be powerless to prevent the placing on the ballot of initiative
measures designed to play a part in the process of amending the United States Con-
stitution even though such initiative proposals clearly did not comply with State re-
quirements as to the necessary number of signatures, time of filing, and the like.
105 S. Ct. at 6. Declining review for nonjusticiability of at least the type of Article V issues
presented in Uhler and Harper is unlikely, and Jusitce Rehnquist's reasoning is valid. See
supra note 118. However, the same reasoning does not apply to the recognition of Article V as
an exception to the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine. The Supreme Court,
when faced with a challenge to a state court judgment involving an Article V issue may always
decline to review for lack of a "substantial federal question." See supra note 31. This is much
different from stating that a Supreme Court review would be an inappropriate venture into the
realm of advisory opinions that could not affect the outcome of the case. Justice Rehnquist's
language in Uhler implies that because of the adequate state grounds doctrine, the Supreme
Court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. However, when a case fails to present a substan-
tial federal question, the Court declines plenary review despite satisfaction of the jurisdictional
requirements. See Note, supra note 31, at 750.
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